

ARMY TALKS



Problems of Organized Peace



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EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY

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ARMY TALKS

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZED PEACE

HUMAN beings have shown themselves able to organize and maintain peace within certain definite areas. On the whole the size of these areas has tended to increase.

England a thousand years ago was divided into seven separate kingdoms. Only a hundred years ago Germany was divided into little states with a long tradition of mutual warfare.

It would, of course, be foolish to maintain that there is any automatic process of history, which, having united warring tribes into modern nations, will go on and unite these nation-states into bigger units and finally into one world-organization within which all acts of violence would be problems for the police. But history does at least show that lasting peace can be brought to former enemies.

Historic Background

The units which are fighting the present war have been fighting similar wars for some five centuries. Since France and England fought the first modern wars, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, much has changed. Armies are larger and weapons more deadly. Civilians are more completely drawn into the struggle.

Modern warfare long since spread from

Europe to the rest of the world. The present war is not World War II, but World War V or VI. As Europeans moved into Africa, America, Asia and the Pacific, they brought their wars with them.

North America's first world war was that of the League of Augsburg at the end of the seventeenth century, which we called King William's War.

This extension, begun through colonization, spread further as non-European peoples began to learn from Europeans.

The Japanese, in particular, have learned their lessons with uncomfortable thoroughness. Nevertheless, Europe and European state rivalries remain the focus of modern wars, and any study of problems of world organization must begin with a study of the European state-system.

Emergence of Great States

Out of the welter of petty mediæval units, England, France and Spain had by the sixteenth century emerged as great states under strong central governments and held together by ties of language, custom and tradition. By the early eighteenth century, Russia had joined their ranks, and by the mid-nineteenth, Germany and Italy

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had at last been forged into unified states.

Along with these six great states—France, Spain, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Russia—there grew up a series of smaller states, whose independence was in part the product of the rivalry of their great neighbors. Two of these zones are of particular importance as buffers between great rivals; one between France and Germany, composed in modern times of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzerland; the other between Germany and Russia, composed since 1918 of the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

Smaller Nation States

The break-up of the Turkish Empire produced in South-eastern Europe the Balkan zone with Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and a small remnant of Turkey in Europe. Another group of small independent states grew up in Scandinavia, the states of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.

For five centuries portions of these states have been almost constantly at war. Their boundaries have varied from time to time. But it is a striking fact that over this long period the general outlines of the European state-system have remained fairly constant.

Poland, which in the sixteenth century had been a rival of Russia, went into a decline and was at the end of the eighteenth century destroyed as an independent state, and its territory divided among Prussia, Russia and Austria. Yet Poland as an idea and an ideal survived. It still survives in the hearts of millions of Poles today.



The so-called "succession states" given independence at the break-up of the Hapsburg Europe in 1918—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia—still show a stubborn vitality. They will not easily be wiped off the map.



A political map drawn up for any specific date gives the misleading impression of a mosaic. Were all these political units as fixed and literally independent as so many tiles in a mosaic, there would be no problem of peace and war. Actually Europe—and now the world—which looks so solid and immovable on the map—is filled with human beings constantly spilling over the boundaries between political units as travellers, traders, missionaries, and soldiers.

Ideas in word, print and picture cross all boundaries with the greatest of ease. Modern invention has vastly increased the speed of these movements, both physical and spiritual, but here again we must not exaggerate a difference of degree into a difference in kind.

Struggle for Supremacy

In the long series of wars between nation-states in the modern world, the historian can discern a certain pattern. From time to time, one of the great political units, having built up its wealth and strength, begins to try to absorb the territory and the people of other political units. As it succeeds here and there, its ambitions grow, until finally it seems clearly to be seeking to absorb everything within reach, to bring inside a single unit all existing units.

No state in modern times has ever achieved this ambition for Europe, let alone for the world. As soon as one

great state has got a certain way towards absorbing the other, the remaining free states have joined together in a "coalition" and have restored the "balance of power."

Three great states in Europe have tried to break down the European state-system, and all have failed. In the sixteenth century Spain made her bid for supremacy under Charles V.

Then came the turn of France. Twice, under Louis XIV and under Napoleon, France tried for European and world domination. Under Napoleon, indeed, she came closer than anyone has yet come, save perhaps for Germany under Hitler. But Napoleon never conquered Britain, and he failed dismally to absorb Russia.

The two attempts of Germany, under William II and under Hitler, are fresh in everyone's mind. By 1943, it seems clear that Hitler's bid, which seemed in 1940 on the point of success, has already failed. And it has failed in the same way as all the others, because the united strength of the coalition—the United Nations—roused against the successful aggressor has been too strong for that aggressor.

Britain's Consistent Role

Each attempt has been more ambitious than the previous, and has seemed to come closer to success. Certainly the aim at a specific breaking down of the system of independent states has grown steadily more explicit.

In all these wars, Britain has played a consistent role. Thrown out of the continent by the French in the days of St. Joan of Arc, she has ever since refused to seek territorial gains in Europe. She has turned her attention



to sea-power and to lands overseas where, in spite of her set-back in the American Revolution, she has done rather better for herself in the way of territorial gains than any of the great continental land-powers who have sought for world-dominion. But she has by no means been able to keep out of European wars.

Balance of Power

Though British isolationists have always maintained that it was really no concern of Britain's if some continental European power swallowed up the rest, when the actual test of war came the British have thrown themselves heartily into the task of beating in war the aggressive European power. This was true in Napoleon's time, in 1914, and is true today.

What was once the "European balance of power" has now become a "world balance of power," and with this development the United States has clearly come to play in practice



a role similar to Britain's. We joined in 1917 a great coalition to put down Hohenzollern Germany's bid to upset the European state-system. We joined in 1941 a great coalition to put down Hitlerite Germany's and Imperial Japan's bids to upset the world

state-system.

At the very rock-bottom our motives, like British motives, have in one sense been of self-interest. Both Britain and the United States have had to conclude, from the behaviour of the Germans and the Japanese, that these powers had no intention of stopping with the absorption of political units in Europe or in the East, but that they intended, in fact, to absorb us.

This record of the wars of the past five hundred years must be constantly kept in mind if we are to approach sensibly the problem of organizing the world for peace. We must reject the crudely fatalistic idea that as things have been, so they will be, and that these wars of "balance of power" will go on indefinitely in the future. But we must also reject the equally crude idea that the complicated web of human habits can be neatly removed from the loom of time, and brand new materials substituted. We may hope to alter the pattern, but we cannot hope to work with very different materials.

These materials, as the history of the last four hundred years show, are human beings gathered into territorial nation-states. In theory it might be possible to wipe out the inhabitants of one of these nation-states. The Nazis, indeed, seem to have tried to exterminate as many Poles as they could. But even the Nazis, with all their drive and cruelty, have apparently had to leave more Poles alive than dead.

Modern nation-states cannot be wiped out. Indeed, the United Nations are today fighting to maintain, among others, the principle that no power-drunk group should attempt to wipe out by force any nation-state. And yet nation-states, under the system of "balance of power," simply will not stay put.

Methods of Lasting Peace

The problem in its simplest terms is this: given the existence of these nation-states, can relations among them be set up so as to eliminate, or at least greatly lessen, the likelihood of recourse to war?

For purposes of analysis, we can distinguish two contrasting methods of

bringing separate political units together. These methods are first, imperialism, and second, federation.

Imperialism may be defined as the absorption by force of one or more



political units by another. Imperialism in this special technical sense has certainly succeeded in the past. In its

crudest form, the imperial power takes a territory by force, kills off its inhabitants, and plants its own people in the territory.

In the milder forms of imperialism the imperial power may take over a territory and allow its previous inhabitants to live on as a subject group controlled politically and economically by a small group of colonists and administrators of the imperial power.

The Ways of Imperialism

European powers as they carved up Africa for themselves at first held the natives in pretty complete subjection.

Finally, an imperial power may conquer a previously independent political unit and simply incorporate the conquered land and people on an equal basis with its own law and people in a greater unit. By some such process a great modern state like France was built up by its kings from a lot of feudally independent local units.

The record is clear: the method of force, the method of imperialism, has worked in certain instances. But it must be noted that none of these instances are much like the world of nation-states we have today.

The feudal units absorbed into the national unit of France were mostly already French in language and sentiment. Finally—and this is most important—where the imperial method

succeeded best among already civilized peoples of independent political traditions, that is, in the case of the Roman Empire, force gave way almost at once to law, order, and a high degree of self-government in the units making up the Empire.

The Ways of Federalism

A second, and historically much less frequent method of bringing independent units into a large whole is that of federalism. Federalism may be defined as the voluntary establishment by agreement among the constituent units, of a larger unit possessing legal "sovereignty" over its constituent units.

The United States of America furnishes the most striking example of the federal process of making one political unit out of many by voluntary agreement. Switzerland is another.



There are many gradations between union by consent or federation and union by force, or imperialism. Sometimes union by force develops into union by consent, as with the French of Quebec and the Boers of South Africa in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Sometimes—and we Americans should be sobered by this recollection into a full awareness of the difficulties Europe and the world face today—union by consent has to be maintained by force. Our own American union was maintained that way in 1861.

No Ordinary Union

The British union of England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales was more complete than an ordinary federal union. Scotland was left to enjoy certain peculiarities of the Scottish legal system and for certain purposes

there are still separate Scottish administrative bodies.

We need, however, go back no further than the last three years for a striking confirmation of the lesson of history. Not a single one of the European states conquered by Nazi Germany has shown any signs of accepting that conquest. Here, indeed, Hitler has failed more dismally than Napoleon did.

Hitler's propagandists have never succeeded in effectively disguising the realities of German doctrines of racial supremacy and imperialist ambitions, no matter how much they talked of the "New Order" and "we good Europeans." It was, of course, hard to make the gospel of the German master-race really attractive to non-Germans. Everywhere the quislings, men who accepted German domination, were a tiny minority of scoundrels or dupes.

Consent of the Peoples

Any international or regional organization transcending the present system of nation-states must rest ultimately on the free and habitual consent of the peoples of all the member states. This statement is not empty idealism, not a piece of sentimentality, but a sound generalization from experience. Indeed, the sentimentalists, the perverted idealists, are those who imagine that any "master-folk" can impose its will on other peoples by mere force.

A suggestion for organizing peace after this war is that of Anglo-American



alliance. Many well-meaning citizens of the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations are saying these days, "If only we two strong peoples stick together close enough and insist on peace and order

throughout the world, no one will be able to start another war."

Anglo-American Joint Rule

In fairness to most of these Americans and Britishers, it may be admitted that they do not mean that, now that a German-Japanese attempt to rule the world has failed, the Anglo-Saxons should try the same tactics themselves. They really mean—most of them anyway—that Anglo-Saxons should try to do by decent methods what the Germans tried to do by cruel methods. But to the hundreds of millions of non-Anglo-Saxons, to the French, the Russians, and other Europeans, to the Chinese and to the people of India, to the peoples of Latin America, it all could sound like Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

No matter how excellent our intentions, no matter how benevolent the work of our relief agencies during the present emergency, the record of history shows that foreign peoples of developed national consciousness—and China and India must now be counted among such peoples—will not in the long run accept domination by an Anglo-Saxon joint-rule.

Federal World Government

At the other extreme of planning for world peace is the project for a federal government of the world, for merging some sixty-odd independent and "sovereign" political units into a federated United States of the World much as in 1789 the thirteen sovereign states of the North American seaboard were merged into the United States of America.

The difficulties of establishing and getting to work the machinery of such a super-state, with the essential compulsory powers of a state—taxation, police, justice—seem at present quite beyond human powers.

In the world of today the necessary

conditions for world-wide federal union may not exist. They are not created in any short space of time. World-wide federal union, attractive though the idea be to many thoughtful men and women, must remain a goal of the future.

Strong Desire to End Wars

The difficulties that make complete world-union impossible at present need not, however, prove insuperable against more modest plans for better organized international relations. Our generation is ripe for some effort to get over what has been well described as the present "international anarchy."

For the average man and woman all over the world—even in enemy countries, with the possible exception of Japan—war has lost whatever glamor it may have had in the innocent days of 1914. For the overwhelming majority of the world's peoples, the desire for peace is real and concrete.

Broadly speaking, three kinds of levels of organized action seem possible. Actual details of planning and working can only come out with experience, but the broad lines are clear.

Peace Organizations

First, some organization to do, and do better, the work of the old League of Nations seems absolutely necessary.

The League of Nations carries today the memory of failure, and will certainly not be revived in its old form. It may be well to attempt a less ambitious international organization than the old League and to be content with setting up an institution designed to permit

regular consultations among governments, and to give the sort of expert advisory and research services in many





fields the International Labour Office of the League gave so well.

Many people, indeed, think that a new League should be more ambitious than the old, that it should have stronger powers of sanctions, should even have some kind of police at its command.

It would seem wiser to start with limited spheres, perhaps of consultation only, not of action at all, and expand to wider ones rather than to start with very wide ones and then be forced, as the old League was forced, to give ground steadily and ultimately collapse.

Second, real powers could be given to smaller groupings of states within a loose world-organization. These groupings might be of two sorts, regional and functional. Planning, at least, for regional federations has already gone far in the south-eastern European region, which in 1938 comprised the small and middle-sized states of Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece.

A single union of all these states would be a geographical fantasy. But various possibilities of federal

union, such as a Baltic union, a Polish-Czechoslovakian union, a Balkan union, are by no means impossible. The obstacles in the way of any of them are great.

A Scandinavian union of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and perhaps including Finland, is a real possibility. The small states of Central America—Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Salvador, and Panama—would have everything to gain from federal union. None of these, or other possible unions of states, would find easy going, and some might fall apart. But any success would be an invaluable step forward.

Functional Unions

Functional unions among states would not necessitate the abandonment by any member-state of what is called "sovereignty," and would therefore perhaps be the most practical beginning of actual effective cooperation. A functional union is a voluntary agreement among states to do certain specific things together according to regular rules and procedure.

The International Postal Union is a good example. More illuminating, since a similar achievement among "sovereign" states would be a real step forward, is the example of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The TVA cuts across state lines, and performs certain services for a whole "natural" region.

War Agencies—Peace Agencies

A Danube Valley Authority, concerned with the economic welfare of a region cutting right across national boundaries, though it would present harder problems than did the TVA, might prove an even more useful experiment. There are almost infinite possibilities for such functional unions, big and little, broad and narrow.

Third, there are the agencies of cooperation among the United Nations

already brought into being by the necessities of war—lend-lease, relief, military government of occupied territories, and so on. These are mostly functional, and indeed rather narrowly so, and owe their undoubted success in part to the sheer pressure of necessity to beat the enemy.

The Prospects for Peace

After the last war, similar working international instruments of cooperation were hastily abandoned with the peace, under the mistaken notion that we could automatically get back to the idyllic days before 1914. This time there are good signs that we shall be wiser and not attempt too sudden a transition from war to peace. But we may well make the necessary adaptations to turn these war agencies into permanent peace agencies.

What are the prospects that some of these forms of international organization—world league, regional federations, functional unions, war agencies transformed into peace agencies—can really be made to work in our time? As usual in human affairs, neither an unqualified optimism nor an unqualified pessimism is likely to give the right answer. One may risk the guess that the general temper of people is more favorable than in 1918 to the success of such organizations.

How to Overcome Obstacles

A moderate pessimism which takes account of real difficulties, provides a better atmosphere for practical action than does oversimplifying optimism. In 1918 too many people talked too glibly of the "war to end war," too many people thought the League of

Nations would run itself. Today there is at least the chance that we have attained a closer feeling for reality.



There are certainly conditions now existing which make for possible improvements in international relations. There is a widespread disgust with the cruelty and waste of modern war, a disgust strong even among the German people. There is an increasing realization that the economics of modern times have made the nation-state,

misguided idealists and "liberals" do, against all aspects of Nationalism, and urging that it be destroyed root and branch. It cannot be destroyed. The real problem is not the elimination of Nationalism, but the taming of it, the putting of it to good instead of bad use.

We do not want to dry up the river because it rages into occasional destruc-



especially in Europe, a unit impossibly small, that tariff barriers, exchange controls, exclusive trade agreements have ended by taking away from the common man the security they were supposed to promote.

There are, however, equally certainly conditions unfavorable to the prospect for international cooperation. In one sense, these conditions are simply man's imperfections. But for problems of international relations in our day, these unfavorable conditions focus in the institutions, habits, in the whole way of life we call Nationalism.

Now there is no use railing, as some

tive floods—we couldn't dry it up if we did want to. What we do want to do is to control the floods, harness the river, put it to life-giving human uses.

Two of the ways in which Nationalism—and especially Nationalism among the stronger political units of the world—manifests most clearly its power for destruction are imperialism and isolationism. A great people inspired by imperialist Nationalism will try to absorb other peoples by force. **Many great peoples have tried this, and all have failed in the long run.**

A great people inspired by isolationist Nationalism will try to avoid as

far as possible binding itself to any legal limitations in its relations with other peoples. But since inevitably its citizens trade with citizens of other countries, travel in other countries, study in other countries, read the books, debate the ideas, catch the enthusiasms, of other countries, isolationist peoples eventually find that they are fighting a war with other countries.

Imperialism and isolationism are both in this real world of ours ultimately destructive forms of Nationalism. Constructive Nationalism is more difficult both to define and to attain.

Constructive Nationalism

To be specific, let us take one of the innumerable problems of international relations facing the United States and the world, the problem of commercial aviation. An imperialistic America might—to take an extreme example—insist on a world-wide monopoly for American commercial planes, such traffic to be wholly in American hands everywhere, and no other nation to have any commercial planes.

An isolationist America might—and this is equally extreme—insist on limiting American commercial aviation to routes within the continental United States, and our territories and dependencies overseas, with, of course, foreign planes rigorously excluded. Both these extremes are, of course, absurd. The perfection of morality and internationalism would be for all parts of the world to be free to planes of all nations, complete freedom of the skies—and landing fields. This, too, is, however unfortunately, absurd in our world.

Compromise Gets Results

The way of compromise is to work out in agreement with all other nations concerned in commercial aviation

detailed arrangements giving American planes a fair share of business everywhere. "Fair share" of course does not define itself; the attempt to define it is a vital part of the process of compromise.

Clearly we should not claim as our share anything like a monopoly. But if another nation denies us all access to its airfields? Being strong, we should try to exercise one of the virtues and privileges of strength, which is patience. We should try to bring the recalcitrant nation around by negotiation, using the international apparatus available for such negotiation.



A difficult task, even in so concrete and relatively simple a business transaction. But there is no easy way to international peace. All the difficult civic virtues that make democracy possible must be exercised—ability to imagine one's self in the other fellow's place, willingness to let the other fellow have his share, toleration of the other fellow's peculiarities, acceptance of the necessity of obeying law established by contract as umpire in the game, willingness to accept argument, discussion, arbitration as the sole way of changing law.

It's Up to the People

These are virtues hardly attained within nation-states. Their attainment in international relations will be difficult. But unless the common people, especially in the great democracies, can make a real beginning towards attaining them, no amount of planning for international peace, no devoted work by experts and technicians, can get anywhere. We have got to lift ourselves by our bootstraps. No one is going to do it for us.



Preparation

IT is suggested that the discussion of this topic be started by having two or more men prepare themselves in advance for defense of one of the following plans of organization for peace discussed by the author in this issue of **ARMY TALKS**:

Anglo-American Alliance. World Federation. A League of Nations. Functional Unions of Groups of Nations. Which of these plans do you favor? Why? Do you suggest still another plan? Why?

Another suggestion for opening the discussion is to pose the question "What was wrong with the League of Nations?" and draw out suggestions from the men regarding the kind of organization which they think will correct the weaknesses of the League.

It may be assumed that most of us prefer to live in a world at peace. The basic question treated in this issue of **ARMY TALKS** is "How can we maintain peace?" Doubtless, some of us believe that war is inevitable. It might be a good idea to ask how many think this to be true. The leader should then proceed to draw out the opinions of those who think that war can and should be prevented, and why? From this approach it will be a natural step to the consideration of "how?"

This topic offers a good opportunity to discuss the points of view taken by the authors of the following books:—

A Time for Greatness, by Herbert Agar.

One World, by Wendell Willkie.

U.S. Foreign Policy, by Walter Lippman.

This is the most important question before the whole world today. There is no question about the final outcome of this war, up to the point of complete military victory. But what about the peace? There is real danger that the United Nations may not be wise enough to design a peace which will be lasting. And perhaps, more important still, the United Nations may not be courageous enough to take the measures to make the continued sacrifices, and to put forth the continued effort necessary to maintain the peace.

What responsibility do we men in uniform have in making and maintaining the peace? Is it possible that we may be the chief cause for losing the peace?

Why has the United States entered two great World Wars in one generation?

Do you think the United States could possibly evade entering the next World War, if and when it should come? Why?

These are very vital questions to each of us. Our children and our children's children will hold us accountable for our answers.

Just what can we do now to prevent the possibility of another World War?

Most of us feel ourselves pretty helpless in answering these questions. But we have a big self-interest in the correct answers. Furthermore, the answers must be given by men very much like ourselves. Indeed, we, ourselves, in the final analysis, must give the answers, if there is to be lasting peace.



QUESTIONS

FOR THE DISCUSSION

Q. : Of what advantage is a knowledge of earlier European and world history in the contemplation of present world problems ?

Q. : Should we refuse to allow Germany's 80 million people participation in world affairs ? Why ? Would it be feasible to segregate Germany from such participation ?

Q. : Are you in favor of planning regional federations such as a Balkan Union Federation, or a Polish-Czechoslovakian Union ?

Q. : Would a Danube Valley Authority, working for the economic benefit of a region cutting across national boundaries be likely to operate for good relations between the countries involved ?

Q. : Should we keep alive war agencies such as Lend-Lease and AMGOT after the war is over ?

Q. : Is there any reason why, if the League of Nations was proved a failure, a similar world advisory committee should succeed ? . . . should fail ?

Q. : How are we as individuals going to shoulder our responsibilities as citizens, not only of the U.S.A., but of the world, and in what way can we set about doing it now ?

Q. : What will be the reaction of the U.S. when peace has been declared ? Will it return to isolationism ? Will it attempt to develop an international attitude ? Will it achieve a unified policy in either direction ?

The discussion leader will discover that the text is broken with numerous headings in order to point up the material for outline and discussion.

Make the initial talk informative, factual, and brief ; provoke the men to discussion ; bring in extra material—maps, charts, reference books ; above all, do not read the text.

The "Handbook for Discussion Leaders" remains as a source for guidance and information. It should be referred to continually. Requests for additional copies of ARMY TALKS should be made to your local Special Service Officer.

REGIONAL SECRETARIES FOR ADULT EDUCATION TO H.M. FORCES

It is suggested to Commanding Officers and Special Service Officers that many of the topics presented in ARMY TALKS may be profitably followed up by lectures. The resources of the Central Advisory Council for Adult Education in H.M. Forces, through its 23 Regional Committees, are available on requisition of Special Service Officers. By agreement between the Chief of Special Service and the British War Office, all procurement of British civilians as lecturers or instructors will be made through the Regional Committee Secretary in your area. They are:

- Aberdeen**: J. A. DAWSON, Esq., C.I.E., C.S.I., Forestry Dept., University of Aberdeen, Old Aberdeen, Scotland. Tel.: Aberdeen 8269.
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